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ABSTRACT 
 
Using longitudinal data on individual workers from six European countries for the period 1995-2001, the 
authors analyse empirically the relationship between labour market transitions and wage growth; in 
particular, whether transitions across states in the labour market have any significant influence on 
wage dynamics and the size of this influence. In addition to the incidence of unemployment and 
inactivity spells on wages, the effects of the duration of job interruption, the time elapsed since job 
ending and the reasons for job interruption are analysed as well. 
 
NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
This paper analyses the links between labour market transitions and wage changes 
experienced by men in several countries of the European Union, during seven consecutive years 
(1995-2001) with data from the ECHP. The question addressed is whether employment transitions 
affect wage dynamics and, if so, to which extent they do. For that, we study male wage earners in 
Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Portugal and the UK.  
The main results may be summarised as follows:  
First of all, workers who experience an employment interruption and go through an 
unemployment or inactivity spell between two jobs, suffer relative wage losses when they re-enter 
employment. Wage losses are more intensive when job interruptions imply an inactivity spell than 
when they are related to unemployment. This is the case in all the countries of our study except in 
the UK, where the effect of both types of transitions is similar and very small. 
Secondly, the scarring effect of non-employment spells on wages is larger the longer the non-
employment spells are, particularly in France, the UK and Spain. All the same, the scarring effect 
aggravates more with time for inactivity spells than for unemployment spells.  
Thirdly, the negative effect of unemployment on the evolution of re-entry wages is temporary 
among workers in the UK and France, and tends to vanish after one year in the new job. However, 
in other countries, namely, in Spain, Germany, Italy and Portugal, this effect is more persistent, 
since wage scars tend to become more intensive with time. This is a common result for all age 
groups, although the losses are more serious for those aged between 30 and 45. 
Finally, as regards the willingness in the labour market transition, individuals who experience 
voluntary transitions tend to register wage gains in their new jobs, although this is significant only in 
Italy and Portugal. On the other hand, dismissed employees or those whose employment contracts 
came to an end register wage losses.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper aims to analyse the relationship between labour market transitions and individual wage 
growth in different countries of the European Union. Our interest is in knowing whether transitions 
across states in the labour market have any significant influence on wage dynamics and the size of this 
influence (if any)1. Amongst more specific questions to tackle, we could select the following: Are there 
either gains or losses due to job mobility? Is willingness to move influencing this gain or loss? Are there 
different wage dynamics among those who move across jobs through a non-employment experience, 
those who move directly across jobs and those who stay with their employer? Should wage losses be 
observed amongst workers hit by unemployment, are they permanent or temporary? If unemployment 
spells cause wage losses, are they due to the mere incidence of unemployment or to the duration of 
unemployment spells? Are wage gains and losses heterogeneous across different types of workers? 
These are very relevant questions both from an academic perspective and from the social policy 
maker viewpoint. For instance, the influence of dismissals and unemployment spells on wage dynamics 
is crucial because, should individuals be scarred by unemployment experiences, these transitions 
would have a lasting influence on wage differentials and on incentives to come back to employment. 
Therefore, the plausible long-term effects of unemployment on wages may determine individual 
behaviour in the labour market. Should we detect scarring effects of unemployment (incidence and/or 
duration) on wages, employment policies should be targeted at reducing both unemployment incidence 
and duration.  
Previous works have focused their attention on some of the above-mentioned issues. One 
strand of the literature has studied the impact of job-to-job movements on wages (Mincer, 1986), while 
another tries to measure the size of wage losses caused by non-voluntary movements (dismissals) 
upon re-employment of workers (Hamermesh, 1987; Jacobson et al., 1993; Burda and Mertens, 2001; 
Arulampalam, 2001; and Gregory and Jukes, 2001). Other works analyse the influence of the 
accumulation of transitions out of employment on wage losses (Stevens, 1997). And finally, there are 
some that look at differences across countries, using differences in labour market institutions as a tool 
to provide an explanation (Kuhn, 2002). 
This paper also aims to provide comparative evidence. The dataset used here is the European 
Community Household Panel (hereinafter, ECHP). Being a European endeavour, this data-set was 
                                               
1 Transitions in the labour market are to be classified as follows: direct job to job movements (“E E”), movements across 
jobs through unemployment (“E U E”) or through inactivity (“E I E”). They may also be either voluntary (if a better 
job is achieved) or involuntary (when a temporary contract comes to an end or due to an individual or collective dismissal). 
This heterogeneity will be taken into account in the empirical analysis developed in the following pages. 
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designed and launched by Eurostat to obtain comparable and dynamic figures about many aspects, 
including labour market issues, several types of income, living standards, education and training, 
employment and not employment-related satisfaction, health and migration among many others.   
Two features of the ECHP may help to throw light upon the link between job mobility and wage 
dynamics. On the one hand, it is a longitudinal dataset, which is a basic requirement for tackling 
longitudinal issues, such as both labour market transitions and wage mobility. On the other hand, it 
provides homogeneous information for different countries, which allows for a comparative approach. 
Comparative approaches are useful when researchers want to investigate the effect of institutional 
frameworks on their variables of interest, since institutional frameworks tend to be 
macroeconomic/context variables that vary across countries (and, sometimes, also across time). 
Should the effects of an explanatory variable on a dependent variable be consistent in different 
countries, then we may be reinsured that our labour market hypotheses hold and the market forces 
driving the behaviour of our dependent variables are strong enough. 
In order to find evidence on different institutional frameworks, we have chosen six countries: 
Spain, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and United Kingdom. We will use all the waves of the ECHP 
except the first one, since it lacks information on the type of contract, which is a very relevant variable 
both on determining transitions out of employment and across jobs, and wage formation.  
The contents of the paper go as follows. Section 2 surveys both the theoretical approaches and the 
empirical literature on job mobility and wage mobility. Section 3 explains how we have selected our 
sample and constructed the main relevant variables and displays a first description of the sample. 
Section 4 is devoted to the empirical strategy (we perform a fixed-effects or within groups estimation) 
and to describe the main methodological problems to be tackled in the study of job mobility and wage 
mobility. Section 5 shows the main results for the estimations, which will be performed both jointly and 
separately, for each country. Section 6 summarises the main results and provides a conclusion.  
 
2. Literature survey 
The link between job mobility and wage mobility has motivated a large amount of empirical 
work in the last years, particularly that focusing on the possible scarring effect of unemployment spells 
on the subsequent jobs and on the progression in the working career. This responds to a two-fold 
motivation. On the one hand, different economic theories lead to different predictions on the effect of 
labour market transitions on wages.  This urges for empirical analysis to disentangle the puzzle. On the 
other hand, the dynamic nature of the relation between employment transitions and wage growth 
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requires the use of longitudinal data sets, which have not been available in most European countries 
until recently2.  
The first theoretical approach to the multidimensional problem of job mobility, wages and wage 
growth was developed in Blumen et al. (1955). In this first approach, workers who move across jobs 
(movers) and those who remain with the same employer (stayers) are assumed to be inherently 
different. Movers are less stable and less productive than stayers, and their wages are, accordingly, 
lower. Therefore, the problem comes down to a matter of individual (unobserved) heterogeneity 
(Farber, 1994). 
A Human Capital perspective would stress the relevance of investments in specific human 
capital amongst stayers, which are not transferable to other firms or jobs (Becker, 1962; Parsons, 
1972; Hashimoto, 1981). Through experience and on-the-job training workers acquire specific 
qualifications along time (being, therefore, correlated with tenure or experience) that contribute to 
productivity and wages. This makes job mobility less attractive: should returns to specific qualifications 
increase faster than the ones to general education, the probability that an external offer will exceed the 
current wage (after adjusting for the cost of the transition itself) will decrease with seniority (Mortensen, 
1978). 
In this framework, the (un)willingness of the transitions in the labour market is crucial to make 
predictions on wage growth. Workers will only move voluntarily if the offered wage exceeds the current 
one. Nevertheless, workers who unwillingly detach from their employers (and, therefore, cannot obtain 
returns to specific qualifications) are very likely to experience wage losses when they come back to 
employment. In many cases dismissed workers will experience an unemployment spell, which may 
also contribute to future wage losses. On the one hand, there is a risk of human capital deterioration 
and qualifications get obsolete with time. This will reduce productivity and, as a result, re-employment 
probabilities and wages as well. On the other hand, if employers have limited/imperfect information 
about workers’ productivity at the moment of hiring them, they may take former experiences as a signal 
for productivity. This would lead them to discriminate against workers with prior unemployment spells 
and offer them lower wages (Vishwanath, 1989; Pissarides, 1992). 
The development of specific qualifications in a job or a firm is not the only explanatory factor for 
(relatively high) wages. Other factors are efficiency wages, the role of unions, and deferred payment 
mechanisms, among others. As a result, a job loss may end up in wage losses if workers receive a 
higher wage in the former employer than what they would have obtained in other firms. For instance, 
                                               
2 With the exception of the German (GSOEP) and the British (BHPS) household panels.  
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when workers move to a new firm, they may be renouncing wage increases and compensations that 
are not directly linked to productivity but to mere seniority. This may worsen if workers and employers 
sign long term contracts, which provide initial wages below productivity in exchange for higher wages in 
the future (Lazear, 1981). 
The Job Matching Theory predicts a possible positive effect of job mobility on wages. This 
could happen if workers willingly leave their jobs in the pursuit of a better matching in the labour market 
(Jovanovic, 1979a): should they succeed, wages will be higher in the new jobs. Another argument for 
explaining this increase in wages with job mobility is based on whether job mobility helps workers to 
learn about their own productivity. If workers improve their awareness about their own productivity with 
time, they will tend to leave those jobs where they do not experience improvements in productivity with 
seniority, so that a stable employer-employee matching will be a signal of high productivity, and high 
productive workers are, accordingly, highly paid  (Jovanovic, 1979b). In this context, unemployment will 
not necessarily negatively influence final wages, since it is seen as an investment period that may 
foster a better matching with a future employer.  
Empirical evidence about the impact of job-to-job movements on wages (direct moves across 
jobs) shows that job mobility pays, since it is linked to wage increases (Mincer, 1986). Nevertheless, 
empirical literature on non voluntary movements -particularly based in Anglo-Saxon evidence- find that 
dismissed workers do register wage losses when they re-enter employment, and they are more 
relevant the longer the tenure they had accumulated in their former jobs (Hamermesh, 1987, Ruhm, 
1991, Jacobson et al., 1993, amongst others, for the North American case; Arulampalam, 2001, and 
Gregory and Jukes, 2001, for the British case). Some pieces of evidence also point at accumulation of 
transitions out of employment as the main explanatory factor for those wage losses (Stevens, 1997). 
Nevertheless, these results do not seem to be corroborated in Continental Europe (Burda and Mertens, 
2001, using a German data-set, and Kuhn, 2002)3. 
The hypotheses derived from the theoretical approaches are based on assumptions about the 
institutional framework prevalent in the labour market. But the real institutional framework may well 
differ from the one assumed to hold in the theory, so that, as empirical evidence shows, reality is not 
always consistent with the expected trends accross countries. One of the potential explanations to 
differences across countries as regards the outcome of job mobility may be found in the differences in 
the institutional framework. Institutions that affect both wage determination and job mobility vary across 
                                               
3 Kletzer (1998) is an excellent survey of North American evidence on the topic. Kuhn (2002) compares results for some 
European countries, the US, Canada, Australia and Japan. 
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countries. But institutions should not be studied one by one (or just one dimension of an institution) but 
as a whole (Bertola and Rogerson, 1997). One of the features of institutions is their multidimensionality, 
so that trying to take a simple measure of one or some of their components may generate a fairly 
vague impression of their relative rigidity or flexibility.  This means that, even in the same country, a 
particular component of an institution may have a positive influence on labour market transitions and 
their outcome, whereas another component may have the opposite effect.  
As regards comparative evidence, an interesting comparative joint work is gathered in Kuhn 
(2002). It displays, at least, two results: first, it corroborates the previous evidence about dismissal 
causing deep and long lasting wage losses in the US and the UK, where employment protection 
legislation is somehow weak and unionisation rates are low; second, in countries where labour markets 
are, a priori, less flexible, with a more restrictive employment protection legislation and a more 
compressed wage structure (such as in Continental Europe) wage losses due to dismissals are small 
or even null. In any case, those wage losses are relevant for those workers who had been for a long 
time in the jobs they lost and for those who have experienced long unemployment periods4. 
 
3. Sample selection, main variables and descriptive analysis 
3.1. Sample selection 
As said in the introduction, the dataset used in the paper is the European Community 
Household Panel. The information displayed in the ECHP allows researchers to distinguish between 
two groups of individuals: those who remain with the same employer during all the observation period 
(seven waves, covering from 1995 to 2001) and those who represent some sort of interruption with or 
without an intermediate non-employment spell. For the purposes of our analysis, interviewees must 
accomplish the following criteria to be included in the sample.  
Firstly, they must have answered the personal questionnaire during the seven waves of the 
observation period and be classified as employed, unemployed or inactive in all of these interviews5. 
Secondly, since our basic endogenous variable is wage growth, we are only interested on individuals 
who report, at least twice, a positive wage. Thirdly, for the sake of homogeneity, only earnings from 
paid employment are considered and income from self-employment is excluded. Fourthly, we focus on 
men, since the analysis of job mobility and wage growth for women is more complicated, due to the 
                                               
4 Other comparative studies concerning European countries are Davia (2005), and García-Pérez and Rebollo (2005). 
5 The motivation for this selection is that the lack of information on the individual labour market status wave by wave avoids 
the construction of the basic transition variable through unemployment or inactivity. 
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relevance of job interruptions that do not deal with labour market events, but with marriage, child 
rearing and the like. Moreover, in order to avoid labour market transitions related with early retirement, 
the sample is restricted to those who were 18 to 58 years old in 1995 (the first moment when we 
observe them). The last restriction is that extreme values in the wage distribution (i.e., the first and the 
last percentile) have been dropped to avoid distortions caused by out-layers.  
We want to stress that the unemployment and inactivity spells we have taken into account in 
the analysis take place during the observation period (1995-2001) and we are unable to consider prior 
labour market transitions. Moreover, we have not omitted observations due to missing values in several 
relevant categories in order to avoid too many restrictions in the sample selection. Therefore, we have 
given a specific category to cases with missing information, which are used in the estimations as 
additional regressors.   
Once the selection criteria are accomplished, the sample is formed by 9,205 men, which make 
56,691 observations. Around 20 per cent of these correspond to German interviewees, 19 per cent to 
French, 18 per cent to Italians, 16 per cent of Spanish, 17 per cent of Portuguese and 10 per cent to 
British.  
 
3.2. Relevant variables 
The ECHP questionnaire addresses several aspects that are very relevant for the current 
analysis. On the one hand, we have computed gross hourly wage using the information on monthly 
gross wage and working week. To make figures comparable, we have adjusted wages using parity 
purchase power indexes.  
On the other hand, job interruptions have been derived from the information about the 
beginning of current job, the end of last job and whether there has been an unemployment period prior 
to the current job and, in that case, how long this unemployment spell was.  
Therefore, if an individual was employed in 1995, the details about the month and year when 
the current job started and the date of the interview allow computing job tenure in the current job. In 
successive waves, the comparison between job tenure and the elapsed time between the last and the 
current interview allows us to infer whether there has been a job interruption between last and current 
interview. Should job tenure be shorter than elapsed time since the last job, the interviewee is assumed 
to be in a different job to the one (s)he held in the previous wave. This movement may entail a non-
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employment spell. Questions about previous unemployment spells help to find out whether the 
movement across jobs has entailed an unemployment spell and, in that case, its duration6. 
In addition, it is also possible to know the type of transition from answers to the question about why 
they ceased employment. These answers may be grouped into voluntary movements (direct 
movements across jobs) and involuntary (end of contract, individual or collective dismissal, and other 
reasons). 
 
3.3 Basic descriptive analysis 
It is somehow difficult to find a way to summarise all the information related to individuals who 
have made many different types of transitions across labour market states. Given that the relevant 
information is the labour market status prior to the current job, we have defined several groups 
according to their situation in the previous year. We have, therefore, divided wage earners among 
those who were employed (either in a different job or in the same job), those who were unemployed 
and those who were inactive.  
Table A.1 in the Appendix gathers the average for the variables included in the analysis for 
different groups according to the status in the labour market in the previous year. It may be seen that 
95 per cent of observations come from employment, almost 4 per cent come from unemployment and 
hardly 1 per cent come from inactivity. Should we focus on those who have experienced a job 
interruption (the movers), approximately 87 per cent of them come directly from a different job, 10 per 
cent have experienced unemployment between jobs and 3 per cent have experienced inactivity.  
Table A.1 provides information on wages as well. Workers who have been continuously 
employed register a higher average gross hourly wage (more than 10 €) than those who come from 
unemployment (6.6 €) or inactivity (nearly 8€). At the same time, average wages for those who 
experience transitions are, on average, 1€ below the one for always employed workers. These results 
show first evidence that job mobility, when it is linked to a non–employment spell, may lead to lower 
wages. However, there could be observable or non-observable characteristics that contribute to wage 
dynamics as well, which call for a multivariate econometric analysis. Preliminary analysis should, 
therefore, be taken with care.  
                                               
6 It is also possible to know when movements across jobs have entailed an inactivity period and its duration. To find it out, 
we use questions related to unemployment spells previous to the current job, prior labour market status and reason for last 
job being ended. Should the answer to this question be “marriage, child rearing, looking after elderly or ill persons, study, 
doing military service or being ill”, we compute them as inactivity spells. 
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For instance, when we take age into account, the prior evidence gets somewhat tinged. 
Workers over 35 are far more present in the group of workers always employed (around 74 per cent of 
them belong to this age group) whereas those who come from unemployment or inactivity tend to be 
younger (41 per cent of those who come from unemployment and 59 per cent of those who come from 
inactivity are younger than 30 years old). As a consequence, labour market experience is far higher 
amongst those who are always employed.  
As regards job characteristics, there are also relevant differences: those who come from 
employment are characterised by a higher proportion of full time workers (99 per cent) with permanent 
contracts (91 per cent) and jobs in the public sector are more common (27 per cent) as well as jobs in 
firms with more than 100 employees (25 per cent). Amongst those who come from unemployment, 
temporary contract holders represent 54 per cent, 85 per cent work in the private sector, and 96 per 
cent work full time. Workers coming from unemployment tend to be concentrated in certain industries. 
Thus, 41 per cent work in building, retail and restaurants and hotels, and 67 per cent work in small 
enterprises (with less than 50 employees). Most of these workers ceased employment due to end of 
the contract (42 per cent) or due to an individual dismissal (27 per cent). Finally, those who come from 
inactivity are, to a certain extent, similar to those coming from unemployment: most of them work in 
small firms and in the private sector. Nevertheless, compared to those who come from an 
unemployment spell, there is a higher proportion of individuals who hold a permanent position (58 per 
cent) in non manual qualified posts and they tended to cease in their last jobs due to other reasons, 
such as marriage, looking after either children, elderly or ill persons, study, attend the military service or 
sickness. 
 
3.4. Complementary descriptive analysis 
Here we aim at showing, in a simple way, wage dynamics and how transitions influence them. 
To this aim, Figure 1 shows the evolution of hourly gross wage for workers who remain in employment, 
whereas Figure 2 shows the same results for different types of transition. In both figures the continuous 
wage increase is clear, as well as persistent differences in wages across countries. Portugal registers 
the lowest wage levels, quite below France, Germany and the UK. When stable and mobile workers 
are compared, stable workers wages are always above the ones for mobile, with the exception of the 
UK, where both groups are pretty similar, both as regards levels and evolution.  
 (Figures 1 and 2 over here) 
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Figure 3 shows the evolution of mobile and stable workers, this time splitting the sample by age 
group: youths (under 30 years old) adults (31-45) and middle-aged (over 45). Results are very 
interesting: wage levels are higher for mature workers, but wage dynamics are more intensive amongst 
youth. Mobile youth, whose wages are initially lower than those for movers, experience wage increases 
around 40 per cent (taking the whole observation period), whereas stable young workers wages 
increase are more stagnant, and increase around 24 per cent in the whole period. This contributes to a 
final convergence of wages between mobile and stable workers. Amongst adult workers, wages are 
slightly more dynamic for movers (29 per cent) than for stayers (24 per cent). Mobile middle-aged 
workers experience much lower wage increases than their stable counterparts (11 per cent against 31 
per cent), which contributes to increase the already wide gap in wages of stable and mobile workers at 
the beginning of the period. We may say, in summary, that job mobility has a very different impact on 
wages depending on the moment in the life-cycle7.  
(Figure 3 over here) 
Another way of showing the potential relationship between job mobility and wage dynamics is 
to compute the average ratio of hourly gross wages between consecutive waves for stable and mobile 
workers along the observation period. Table 1 registers the results of this exercise. The sample has 
been split here by country, age groups, and we distinguish between movers and stayers, and among 
several types of job interruption, as well as reason for leaving the last employer. The right panel of the 
table shows the same analysis, this time country by country. 
(Table 1 over here) 
We may read information contained in this table in the following way: overall, real hourly gross 
wages in year t+1 have been 1.08 times real hourly gross wages in year t, which means that overall 
year-in-year average wage increase has been 8 per cent. 
Mobile workers always register higher wage increases in all countries (although they are a bit more 
stagnant in Italy). The gap between stable and mobile workers differs across age groups: it is wider for 
youths (3 per cent gap in all countries), slightly lower for those between 31 and 45, and pretty low for 
the middle-aged (it would seem that, on average, wage dynamics are similar across elder mobile and 
stable workers). 
As for employees coming from unemployment or inactivity, youths obtain a relative wage 
increase even despite of coming from non-employment, whereas the advantage is practically non-
                                               
7 We have performed the same analysis by country. Results indicate that differences in wage dynamics across age groups 
are persistent in all countries. Figures are available from the authors upon request but not included in the text for the sake 
of brevity. 
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existent for the middle-aged. Youths (and, to a lesser extent, adults) register wage gains from labour 
market transitions even if they include non-employment spells, whereas the latter is not true for the 
middle-aged. There are differences across countries as well, with wage gains linked to transitions 
through inactivity in Germany and Italy, but not in Spain. 
Information on cause for ceasing in past job corroborates the last evidence8. Workers who 
voluntarily leave their former jobs experience the higher wage increases, and obtain relative gains in 
terms of wage growth as regards stable workers. Youths are, by far, the group who takes more 
advantage of voluntary movements across jobs. On the contrary, dismissed workers aged less than 45 
get lower wage increases (we could say, therefore, that they experience relative wage losses). Those 
over 45 experience higher relative wage losses when the last job ended due to the end of a contract or 
other reasons. Relative wage gains due to labour market transitions are inversely proportional to age. 
These results show a first clear evidence that voluntary job moves generate higher wage growth than 
stability and other types of labour market transitions, with the latter registering more stagnant wages 
than stable workers. However, we may not rule out that observed and unobserved heterogeneity linked 
to jobs and workers explains these differences, which calls for the econometric strategy we develop in 
the next sections. 
4. Methodological issues and empirical strategy 
In order to disentangle whether employment interruptions affect wage dynamics and, if so, how 
much they do, we estimate a standard wage equation in the context of panel data: 
 
itiititit ελαDβX)ln(w +++=                             (1) 
 
where i=1,…,n are workers; t=1,…,7 are time periods (the 7 waves we use from the ECHP data); ln(wit) 
is the logarithm of gross hourly wage of individual i in wave t; Xit is a set of explanatory variables and 
defining the i individual in every wave of the panel  (they may vary along the time); Dit is a dummy 
variable that indicates whether individual i experienced a job interruption before the current job at wave 
t; λi registers the effect of individual unobserved heterogeneity; and εit is the error term in the equation 
(it has constant variance and it is assumed to be uncorrelated with observed and unobserved 
characteristics of individuals along time).  
                                               
8 We have not displayed this information country by country due to the small sample sizes in some groups. 
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With the above-explained strategy, we want to take advantage of two aspects of our dataset: 
we are able to cover all the observation period and to observe either one or more job interruptions. This 
allows the researcher to distinguish as well between voluntary and non-voluntary interruptions. Even 
so, when estimating wage changes through equation (1) we must mention two econometric problems 
that deserve further attention: unobserved individual heterogeneity and sample selection bias9. 
Unobserved individual heterogeneity (λi) arises when unobserved characteristics affect both 
labour market transitions and wage dynamics. Amongst these unobserved individual aspects we may 
encounter productivity, ability, job prospects in the firm, personal relationships and being in good terms 
with co-workers and supervisors, among many others. In both job search models (where workers with 
higher job prospects register longer tenure) and human capital models (where more stable workers 
accumulate more specific human capital, which makes them more productive and, accordingly, 
increase their wages), job tenure and experience are correlated with the unobserved heterogeneity that 
affects both job interruptions and future matches in the labour market. As a result of the correlation 
between observable and unobservable characteristics of the individuals, any OLS estimation would 
generate biased estimates for tenure and working experience (Altonji and Williams, 1997). 
In order to check whether wage dynamics across stable and mobile workers are not affected by 
unobserved heterogeneity affecting simultaneously the probability of moving across jobs and 
productivity (and, hence, wages), we estimate the wage equation using intra-group differences (the 
fixed-effects approach in the panel data literature). In such estimation we eliminate the possible 
correlation between λi and Xit since we do not estimate wage levels, but differences between the wage 
level at time t and the average across the period. We thus compare individuals with themselves along 
the observation period. This strategy has been heavily used in the empirical literature on wage mobility, 
such as Jacobson et al. (1993) and Stevens (1997) using North American datasets, and Arulampalam 
(2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) for the British case10. 
The intra-group estimation is a generalization of the so-called “differences-in-differences” 
technique, which requires information for both stable and mobile workers in two moments in time. This 
                                               
9 There is an additional possible problem, namely the plausible endogeneity of our explanatory variable. This problem 
makes it impossible to distinguish whether the link between job mobility and wage dynamics is causal or whether there are 
intrinsic (observed and unobserved) features of individuals that influence both mobility and wages. The endogeneity 
problem, which has been tackled using both an instrumental variables approach (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, and Topel, 
1991) and structural estimations (Topel and Ward, 1992, Lillard, 1999, and Abowd and Kang, 2002) is quite difficult in our 
case, given that we deal with both direct and indirect – via two types of non-employment - job moves, and both voluntary 
and involuntary transitions, which extraordinarily hinders the search for instruments and the necessary restriction conditions 
to identify a structural model. 
10 The use of this technique stems from the literature on evaluation of active labour market policies, where a treated group 
is compared to a control (non treated) group. 
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particular requirement may generate the second econometric problem, namely, the sample selection 
bias, since we disregard observations of workers who, despite experiencing a job interruption, do not 
register wages either before or after it. In these cases we are not provided with the necessary two 
observations for being able to estimate a fixed-effects model. Should this problem not be tackled, the 
estimates would be, again, biased.  
In order to solve this problem we have estimated a probit model using information of the first 
interview only where the dependent variable equals 1 if the individual is in the sample from the 
beginning of the survey and registers, at least, two observations of wages, and 0 otherwise. The Mills 
ratio has been drawn out of it, and finally, a selection Heckman term has been included in the wage 
equation in order to control for the plausible selection bias. Results in the estimation indicate that the 
error correction term is non significant and, therefore, the coefficients in the wage equation are not 
altered by any selection problem. We can thus conclude that we are working on a random sample. 
Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and Jukes (2001) find similar results using this estimation technique. 
5.  Results from the multivariate models 
This section reviews the results of the multivariate empirical strategy explained in the previous 
one. Results correspond to different specifications of the wage equation (1) for each of the countries, 
for all the countries and for age groups. They are displayed in Tables 2 to 5. 
All the estimations include personal and family characteristics (educational attainment, marital 
status, living with children, and labour market experience) as well as job-related characteristics (type of 
contract, job tenure, working week, occupational group) and employer-related characteristics (firm size, 
public/private sector, industry) as well as dummy variables for each wave and the national 
unemployment rate to control for the business cycle. For the sake of brevity we do not show the 
coefficients for all these control variables. We just will mention that they register the expected signs in 
all estimations: labour market experience and tenure pays (though it defines smaller differences for 
workers over 45 years old) in all countries. On the other hand, permanent contracts are linked to higher 
wages, as well as higher educational attainments. The latter is not homogenous across countries 
though. 
 
5.1.  The effect of unemployment and inactivity on wages 
The estimation in Table 2 is featured by dummy variables related to previous labour market status of 
employed interviewees, both inactivity (I) and unemployment (U). In this specification the effect of a 
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given labour market status is assumed to be constant and persistent effect along time, ceteris paribus. 
Results show that individuals who regain employment after an unemployment spell  (“E→U→E”) suffer 
a 4 per cent wage loss compared to individuals who either do not have any job interruption or move 
directly across jobs. Wage losses are more serious (about 9 per cent) for those who move across jobs 
but through inactivity (“E→I→E”). 
(Table 2 over here) 
This result is consistent across countries, with the exception of the United Kingdom11, where 
the effect of inactivity spells is quite similar to that of unemployment spells. In France and Portugal 
wage losses related to inactivity are larger than in other countries (nearly 13 and 10 per cent 
respectively) whereas wage losses linked to unemployment spells are more intensive in Portugal and 
Italy (above 6 and 5 per cent, respectively).  
In order to check whether this result is consistent across age groups, we have split the sample 
by age group and reproduced the same strategy. The results from such estimations (not shown but 
available upon request) show that both unemployment and inactivity spells scar future wages and that 
these scars are deeper if individuals move across jobs through inactivity. The trajectory labelled as 
“E→I→E” is related to a 6 per cent wage loss, which is relatively constant across age groups, whereas 
the trajectory type “E→U→E” has more negative implications for those over 30 years old. 
 
5.2.  Impact of the duration of the job interruption 
We may also wonder whether transitions through unemployment and inactivity generate the 
same effect on wages regardless the duration in the non-employment spell. In order to study this 
nuance, Table 3 shows results when two variables indicating duration of the non-employment spells 
are included in the models. The reference group would be those individuals who remain with their 
employer. As non-employment spells get longer, subsequent wage losses increase. This wage loss 
may be (human capital models would argue) due to deterioration of specific human capital. The 
scarring effect is more intensive for individuals who stay longer in inactivity than in unemployment. 
(Table 3 over here) 
The effect of the duration of inactivity may be particularly intense in some countries, even 
though one needs to keep in mind that the number of observations in long inactivity-related 
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interruptions is fairly small. The same applies to long-term unemployment in Spain, France and the 
UK12. On the contrary, wage scars tend to be the same whatever the length in Germany, Italy and 
Portugal. 
The estimations across age groups (not shown) end up in similar results to the ones commented in 
the above paragraph: wage losses are more sensitive to the duration of inactivity spells than to the 
duration of unemployment spells, though the latter is more relevant amongst over 45 year-olds. 
 
5.3.  Effects of time elapsed since the interruption and the cause of the interruption 
We have also tried a specification that intends to find out whether the negative effects of non-
employment transitions on wages observed previously are persistent along time. Accordingly, in Table 
4 dummy variables referring to unemployment and inactive past spells have been interacted with time 
elapsed since such job interruptions.  
Results show that workers who have moved across jobs through a recent (less than one year 
before the interview) unemployment spell register a 5 per cent wage scar, ceteris paribus. This 
outcome is relatively constant along time. Therefore it seems that the scarring effect of unemployment 
is not corrected with time. However, this result is not constant across countries and age groups. In 
Spain, Germany, Italy and Portugal, wage scars tend to increase with the elapsed time after the job 
interruption, whereas in the UK and in France wage losses tend to disappear with time (actually, after a 
year). When the estimation is replicated by age groups (results not shown), the negative impact of 
unemployment persists after 12 months only for 31-45 year-olds. 
(Table 4 over here) 
On the other hand, results tend to indicate that individuals who find a job after inactivity register 
increasing wage scars with time. The negative wage scar of inactivity spells on wage growth is 8 per 
cent if the interruption took place less than one year ago, and it doubles that figure if the interruption 
took place more than one year ago. This means that inactivity effects tend to persist and even 
aggravate with time, while unemployment effects tend to vanish with time. This result is particularly 
                                                                                                                                                  
11 Given that the difference between unemployment and inactivity statuses may be somehow blurred for the UK (as in 
Paull, 1997) we have joint in a single estimation transitions via unemployment and inactivity for the British sample. Job 
moves across non-employment generate a wage loss of 3-4 per cent. Results are not shown but available upon request. 
12 This result is in line with Gregory and Jukes (2001) and Nickell et al. (2002) for the UK, and Arranz and García-Serrano 
(2005) for Spain. 
 15 
clear in Portugal and France. When we split the sample by age group, the effect is consistent across 
age groups and more pronounced amongst adults and middle aged. 
Finally, Table 5 shows the results of a different nuance in the estimation: movements have been 
interacted with the reason for the last job to end, which turns up to be a very relevant difference to be 
taken into account. Individuals affected by voluntary labour interruptions experience, in average, 
relative wage increases of 3 per cent when they re-enter employment. On the contrary, those who were 
dismissed or whose employment contract finished experience a 4-5 per cent wage loss. Those who 
leave their job due to other reasons register a similar effect. 
(Table 5 over here) 
These are the results for Portugal and at a lower extent, for Germany, Spain and France. In the 
latter countries, voluntary job moves do not seem to favour relevant wage gains. In Italy voluntary 
employment interruptions have a positive effect on wages, but all other types of reasons for moving 
across jobs do not show significant effects. Finally, in the UK, not even voluntary transitions seem to 
have a positive effect on wages. 
In the estimations by age group (not shown), results are quite similar to those above explained. 
In any case, it seems that dismissals are related to deeper wage scars for those below 45 years old, 
whereas the end of a temporary contract has more intensive effects on those over 45.  
6. Conclusions 
This paper has analysed the links between labour market transitions and wage changes 
experienced by men in several countries of the European Union, during seven consecutive years 
(1995-2001) with data coming from the ECHP. The question addressed has been whether employment 
transitions affect wage dynamics and, if so, to what extent. To accomplish this, we have studied male 
wage earners in Germany, Spain, Italy, France, Portugal and the UK. Here we summarise the main 
results and offer an employment policy conclusion.  
First of all, workers who experience an employment interruption and go through an 
unemployment or inactivity spell between two jobs, suffer relative wage losses when they re-enter 
employment. Wage losses are more intensive when job interruptions imply an inactivity spell than when 
they are related to unemployment. This is the case in all the countries of our study except in the UK, 
where the effect of both types of transitions is similar and very small. 
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Secondly, the scarring effect of non-employment spells on wages is larger the longer the non-
employment spells are, particularly in France, the UK and Spain. All the same, the scarring effect 
worsens more with time for inactivity spells than for unemployment spells.  
Thirdly, the negative effect of unemployment on the evolution of re-entry wages is temporary 
among workers in the UK and France, and tends to vanish after one year in the new job. However, in 
other countries, namely, in Spain, Germany, Italy and Portugal, this effect is more persistent, since 
wage scars tend to become more intensive with time. This is a common result for all age groups, 
although the losses are more serious for those aged between 30 and 45. 
Finally, as regards the level of willingness in the labour market transition, individuals who 
experience voluntary transitions tend to register wage gains in their new jobs, although this is 
significant only in Italy and Portugal. On the other hand, dismissed employees or those whose 
employment contracts came to an end register wage losses.  
Our empirical analysis does not allow us to disentangle whether the wage losses linked to 
observed labour market transitions are due to a deterioration or obsolescence of human capital or to a 
loss of contacts in the labour market, which would reduce the probability of finding a good match in the 
labour market. Both factors are, indeed, relevant, and generate a scarring effect of job interruptions on 
employment careers. Employment policies should be targeted at avoiding both circumstances. On the 
one hand, reducing the duration of non-employment spells through a better connection of supply and 
demand in the labour market is needed. On the other hand, retraining programmes could help to 
recover the losses in human capital during the employment interruption. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Average composition of several groups of workers, according with their prior situation in the 
labour market. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
  Mobility Prior LM status 
 Total Stayers Movers Employed Unemployed Inactive 
 Average Average Average Average Average Average 
Age (years) 40.6 41.9 38.2 40.9 34.9 31.2 
Squared age 1741.7 1834.8 1583.0 1768.2 1319.3 1070.1 
Age groups       
  18-25 0.063 0.026 0.126 0.053 0.203 0.387 
  26-30 0.115 0.083 0.168 0.110 0.205 0.201 
  31-35 0.160 0.152 0.174 0.160 0.174 0.134 
  36-40 0.168 0.185 0.138 0.170 0.133 0.099 
  41-45 0.158 0.187 0.109 0.162 0.106 0.059 
  46-50 0.147 0.177 0.095 0.151 0.074 0.042 
  >50 0.188 0.189 0.187 0.193 0.101 0.075 
Main job       
  Full-time 0.985 0.990 0.977 0.987 0.959 0.938 
  Part-time 0.009 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.031 0.038 
  Missing values 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.010 0.024 
Type of employer       
  Private 0.735 0.684 0.821 0.729 0.850 0.822 
  Public 0.261 0.314 0.171 0.268 0.122 0.170 
  Missing values 0.004 0.002 0.008 0.003 0.028 0.008 
Marital status       
  Married 0.699 0.765 0.587 0.713 0.463 0.351 
  Non married 0.301 0.235 0.413 0.286 0.537 0.647 
  Missing values 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 
Type of contract       
  Permanent 0.889 0.960 0.767 0.916 0.329 0.582 
  Temporary  0.076 0.021 0.171 0.054 0.547 0.293 
  Casual jobs. no contract 0.009 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.036 0.042 
  Other types of employment 0.011 0.004 0.022 0.009 0.041 0.024 
  Missing values 0.015 0.010 0.024 0.013 0.047 0.059 
Education       
  ISCED 5-7 0.229 0.222 0.241 0.231 0.149 0.343 
  ISCED 3 0.324 0.341 0.296 0.326 0.289 0.283 
  ISCED 0-2 0.439 0.432 0.450 0.436 0.546 0.315 
  Missing values 0.008 0.005 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.059 
Unemployment rate 8.146 8.196 8.060 8.115 8.953 7.990 
Countries       
  France 0.190 0.210 0.156 0.193 0.115 0.198 
  Italy 0.179 0.202 0.139 0.180 0.174 0.100 
  Spain 0.156 0.146 0.174 0.149 0.342 0.155 
  Portugal 0.171 0.168 0.176 0.171 0.169 0.228 
  Germany 0.202 0.201 0.204 0.204 0.172 0.167 
  UK 0.102 0.073 0.150 0.104 0.028 0.153 
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Table A.1. (cont.) 
  Mobility Prior LM status 
 Total sample Stayers Movers Employed Unemployed Inactive 
 Average Average Average Average Average Average 
Reason for leaving job       
  Stayers 0.918 0.995 0.786 0.967 0.006 0.000 
  Voluntary transition 0.023 0.002 0.060 0.021 0.064 0.048 
  Individual dismissal 0.016 0.001 0.040 0.005 0.273 0.056 
  End of contract 0.023 0.001 0.060 0.006 0.417 0.083 
  Collective dismissal 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.012 0.005 
  Other reasons 0.011 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.104 0.481 
  Missing values 0.009 0.001 0.023 0.000 0.124 0.325 
Children <12 years       
  One or more 0.373 0.407 0.315 0.377 0.300 0.289 
  None 0.627 0.593 0.685 0.623 0.700 0.711 
  Missing values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Children 12-15 years       
  One or more 0.107 0.119 0.085 0.107 0.097 0.081 
  None 0.893 0.881 0.914 0.892 0.902 0.919 
  Missing values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Occupation(1)       
  1  0.053 0.052 0.056 0.055 0.017 0.058 
  2 0.100 0.102 0.096 0.102 0.051 0.130 
  3 0.130 0.137 0.118 0.131 0.079 0.152 
  4 0.113 0.125 0.093 0.115 0.072 0.114 
  5 0.072 0.077 0.065 0.072 0.089 0.084 
  6 0.013 0.010 0.017 0.012 0.026 0.024 
  7 0.265 0.251 0.289 0.264 0.322 0.188 
  8 0.148 0.149 0.147 0.149 0.143 0.131 
  9 0.081 0.073 0.095 0.077 0.178 0.097 
  10 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.024 0.023 0.023 
Industry(2)       
  1 0.020 0.019 0.023 0.019 0.039 0.039 
  2 0.028 0.032 0.021 0.029 0.016 0.010 
  3 0.160 0.162 0.156 0.161 0.128 0.130 
  4  0.056 0.060 0.048 0.057 0.027 0.039 
  5 0.085 0.091 0.075 0.087 0.058 0.072 
  6  0.118 0.085 0.174 0.111 0.288 0.108 
  7 0.119 0.112 0.130 0.117 0.142 0.173 
  8  0.077 0.072 0.085 0.077 0.070 0.089 
  9 0.088 0.081 0.099 0.088 0.058 0.162 
  10  0.230 0.268 0.166 0.234 0.149 0.171 
  11 0.019 0.017 0.024 0.019 0.024 0.008 
Size of the employer       
  1-4 workers 0.094 0.077 0.124 0.091 0.160 0.158 
  5-19 workers 0.168 0.142 0.212 0.161 0.334 0.223 
  20-49 workers 0.157 0.151 0.167 0.155 0.189 0.174 
  50-99 workers 0.117 0.119 0.113 0.118 0.100 0.103 
  100-499 workers 0.146 0.155 0.130 0.148 0.084 0.135 
  500 or more workers 0.112 0.113 0.112 0.114 0.064 0.113 
  Missing values 0.203 0.241 0.139 0.210 0.067 0.091 
 21 
 
Table A.1. (cont.) 
 
Prior status       
  Employed 0.949 1.000 0.866 1.000 0.000 0.000 
  Unemployed 0.038 0.000 0.101 0.000 1.000 0.000 
  Inactive 0.013 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 1.000 
  Missing values 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Tenure in previous job 
(days) 
3843.2 4976.4 1911.1 4042.3 178.0 183.2 
Previous 
unemployment spell 
(months) 
15.1 0.0 15.5 0.0 15.1 0.0 
LM experience (years) 22.2 23.4 20.1 22.4 18.2 15.7 
Hourly gross wage 
(deflated) 
9.99 10.19 9.09 10.15 6.55 7.91 
Hourly net wage 
(deflated) 
7.60 8.03 6.88 7.72 5.20 6.11 
Observations 56,759 35,775 20,984 53,833 2,183 730 
 
(1) Occupation: 1. Legislators, senior officials and managers; 2. Professionals; 3. Technicians and associate 
professionals; 4. Clerks; 5. Service workers and shop and market sales workers; 6. Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers; 7. Craft and related trades workers; 8. Plant and machine operators and assemblers; 9. 
Elementary occupations; 10 Missing values. 
(2) Industry: 1. Agriculture, hunting and forestry + Fishing; 2. Mining and quarrying + Electricity. gas and water 
supply; 3. Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco; Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather 
products; Manufacture of wood and paper products; Publishing and printing; Other manufacturing; 4. Manufacture 
of coke, refined petroleum/chemicals/rubber & plastic/etc.; 5. Manufacture of metal products, machinery and 
equipment n.e.c.; 6. Construction;  7. Wholesale and retail trade; Repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and 
personal/household goods; Hotels and restaurants; 8. Transport, storage and communication; 9. Financial 
intermediation; Real estate. renting and business activities: 10. Public administration and defence; Compulsory 
social security; Education; Health and social work; Other community. Social and personal service activities; 
Private households with employed persons; Extra-territorial organizations and bodies; 11. Missing values. 
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Table 1. Average year-in-year wage increases, by age groups and countries. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
  Age groups Countries 
 All 18-30 31-45 >45 Germany Spain France Italy Portugal UK 
Total sample 
1.08 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.05 1.10 1.08 
Mobility           
Stayers 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.09 1.07 
Movers 1.10 1.13 1.09 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.12 1.06 1.12 1.09 
Prior LM status           
Employed 1.08 1.12 1.08 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.10 1.05 1.10 1.08 
Unemployed 1.08 1.11 1.09 1.03 1.08 1.11 1.07 1.03 1.06 1.09 
Inactive 1.12 1.17 1.11 1.01 1.15 1.10 1.13 1.11 1.13 1.08 
Reason for leaving prev. job           
Voluntary(E→E) 1.16 1.21 1.16 1.15       
Dismissal 1.07 1.03 1.05 1.08       
End of contract 1.09 1.12 1.07 1.05       
Other reasons 1.14 1.17 1.12 1.00       
Age groups 
          
18-30 years     1.15 1.12 1.13 1.07 1.13 1.12 
31-45 years     1.07 1.09 1.10 1.05 1.09 1.08 
>45 years     1.05 1.07 1.09 1.04 1.09 1.07 
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Table 2. Wage regressions (on log of hourly gross wage), by country. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
 All Germany Spain France Italy Portugal UK 
 Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. Coef. SE Sign. 
Type of contract                      
Permanent - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Temporary  -0.029 0.004 *** -0.054 0.010 *** -0.046 0.009 *** -0.009 0.012  -0.046 0.011 *** -0.014 0.010  -0.063 0.024 *** 
Casual job. no contract -0.038 0.010 *** 0.021 0.015  -0.109 0.035 ***    -0.042 0.018 ** -0.038 0.019 ** -0.168 0.036 *** 
Other arrangements -0.041 0.010 ***    -0.079 0.020 ***    0.011 0.019  -0.040 0.013 ***    
Education attainment                      
ISCED 5-7 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
ISCED 3 -0.017 0.005 *** -0.026 0.010 *** 0.006 0.012  -0.017 0.016  -0.022 0.030  -0.135 0.025 *** 0.011 0.011  
ISCED 0-2 -0.005 0.006  -0.078 0.014 *** -0.011 0.014  -0.032 0.017 ** -0.035 0.030  -0.147 0.026 *** 0.004 0.013  
Tenure in previous job 
                     
<1 year - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1-2 years 0.031 0.004 *** 0.019 0.008 *** 0.027 0.012 *** 0.001 0.012  0.010 0.012  0.010 0.011  0.026 0.010 *** 
2-3 years 0.087 0.005 *** 0.076 0.009 *** 0.046 0.015 *** 0.069 0.014 *** 0.068 0.014 *** 0.032 0.013 *** 0.045 0.011 *** 
3-5 years 0.139 0.005 *** 0.139 0.008 *** 0.082 0.016 *** 0.115 0.014 *** 0.082 0.013 *** 0.068 0.013 *** 0.064 0.012 *** 
5-10 years 0.242 0.006 *** 0.227 0.010 *** 0.090 0.021 *** 0.221 0.017 *** 0.160 0.016 *** 0.135 0.016 *** 0.096 0.017 *** 
10-15 years 0.367 0.007 *** 0.329 0.013 *** 0.104 0.029 *** 0.329 0.021 *** 0.245 0.020 *** 0.209 0.021 *** 0.135 0.026 *** 
15-20 years 0.478 0.009 *** 0.405 0.017 *** 0.123 0.037 *** 0.454 0.025 *** 0.298 0.024 *** 0.264 0.026 *** 0.138 0.036 *** 
>20 years 0.592 0.011 *** 0.507 0.018 *** 0.109 0.044 *** 0.555 0.029 *** 0.371 0.027 *** 0.326 0.030 *** 0.159 0.044 *** 
LM experience 
                     
<5 years - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5-10 years 0.077 0.006 *** 0.073 0.013 *** 0.103 0.017 *** 0.024 0.013 ** 0.036 0.012 *** 0.068 0.013 *** 0.120 0.016 *** 
10-15 years 0.131 0.007 *** 0.144 0.016 *** 0.122 0.023 *** 0.081 0.014 *** 0.076 0.016 *** 0.105 0.018 *** 0.178 0.023 *** 
15-20 years 0.181 0.008 *** 0.184 0.018 *** 0.140 0.029 *** 0.108 0.015 *** 0.153 0.020 *** 0.139 0.023 *** 0.251 0.028 *** 
20-30 years 0.221 0.009 *** 0.230 0.020 *** 0.122 0.034 *** 0.145 0.017 *** 0.201 0.022 *** 0.172 0.027 *** 0.259 0.033 *** 
>30 years 0.258 0.011 *** 0.257 0.023 *** 0.131 0.038 *** 0.174 0.019 *** 0.228 0.025 *** 0.182 0.030 *** 0.277 0.038 *** 
Prior status                      
Unemployed -0.045 0.006 *** -0.034 0.011 *** -0.038 0.013 *** -0.035 0.016 ** -0.055 0.014 *** -0.067 0.014 *** -0.033 0.025  
Inactive -0.087 0.008 *** -0.063 0.016 *** -0.048 0.025 ** -0.133 0.018 *** -0.055 0.023 *** -0.103 0.017 *** -0.034 0.019 * 
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(a) Other control variables are: private or public employer, weekly hours, marital status, children under 12 years old, children 12-15 years old, firm-size, industry, 
occupational group, dummy variables for calendar effects and national unemployment rates. 
(b) Education attainment, type of contract y labour market experience register missing values that have been included as additional categories in order to capture their 
trends/behaviour. Coefficients are not reported in the table. 
(c) *** indicates p value < 0.001, ** indicates p value < 0.05, and * indicates p value < 0.01. 
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Table 3. Wage regressions and previous non employment spells duration, by country. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
 All Germany Spain France Italy Portugal UK 
 Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. 
Time in previous 
unemployment 
                     
0-12 months -0.055 0.007 *** -0.081 0.017 *** -0.037 0.013 *** -0.037 0.021 * -0.064 0.016 *** -0.069 0.015 *** -0.063 0.028 *** 
>12 months -0.042 0.009 *** -0.085 0.014 *** -0.052 0.020 *** -0.095 0.052 * -0.053 0.018 *** -0.064 0.023 *** -0.088 0.054 * 
Time in previous inactivity                      
0-12 months -0.081 0.008 *** -0.071 0.017 *** -0.059 0.025 ** -0.119 0.020 *** -0.046 0.024 ** -0.098 0.017 *** -0.050 0.020 *** 
>12 months -0.274 0.064 *** -0.740 0.183 *** 0.060 0.233  -0.303 0.132 ** -0.036 0.171  -0.745 0.186 *** -0.179 0.109 * 
Notes: see Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Wage regressions and time since re-employment, by country. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
 
 All Germany Spain France Italy Portugal UK 
 Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig 
Time in employment. coming 
from unemployment (U→E) 
                     
0-12 months -0.046 0.006 *** -0.030 0.012 *** -0.044 0.013 *** -0.044 0.017 *** -0.053 0.015 *** -0.070 0.015 *** -0.054 0.027 ** 
>12 months -0.051 0.017 *** -0.065 0.034 ** -0.054 0.030 * 0.020 0.057  -0.067 0.039 * -0.086 0.036 *** 0.074 0.190  
Time in employment. coming 
from Inactivity (I→E) 
                     
0-12 months -0.081 0.009 *** -0.069 0.018 *** -0.059 0.026 *** -0.130 0.022 *** -0.050 0.024 ** -0.102 0.019 *** -0.031 0.022  
>12 months -0.146 0.021 *** -0.039 0.072  0.033 0.099  -0.153 0.031 *** -0.091 0.073  -0.132 0.048 *** -0.097 0.052 * 
Notes: see Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Wage regressions and reason for leaving job, by country. ECHP, 1995-2001.  
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 All Germany Spain France Italy Portugal UK 
 Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig. Coef. SE Sig 
Reason for leaving previous 
job 
                     
Voluntary 0.024 0.008 *** -0.038 0.064  0.014 0.024  -0.027 0.023  0.050 0.020 *** 0.045 0.020 *** 0.008 0.016  
Individual/collective 
dismissal  
-0.035 0.008 *** -0.027 0.013 ** -0.040 0.037  -0.048 0.024 ** -0.013 0.021  -0.064 0.025 *** -0.014 0.021  
End of contract -0.046 0.007 *** -0.083 0.018 *** -0.044 0.022 ** -0.066 0.022 *** -0.008 0.021  -0.038 0.021 * 0.038 0.035  
Other reasons -0.038 0.009 *** -0.030 0.015 ** -0.054 0.030 * -0.050 0.032  0.028 0.026  -0.052 0.022 ** -0.055 0.024 *** 
Missing values -0.111 0.010 *** -0.108 0.023 *** -0.104 0.029 *** -0.154 0.027 *** -0.059 0.020 *** -0.135 0.023 *** -0.005 0.039  
Notes: see Table 2
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Figure 1. Evolution of hourly gross wages amongst stayers, by country. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of hourly gross wages amongst movers, by country. ECHP, 1995-2001. 
Figure 3. Evolution of hourly gross wages for stayers (E) and movers (M), by age groups (18-
30, 31-45 and >45 years). ECHP, 1995-2001. 
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